2 cumulative abnormal returns were negative 1.26%, positive 12.69%, and positive 4.28% for JPMorgan Chase, Bank One, and the combined firms, respectively.
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While the target's CEO and the acquirer clearly benefit from the contracting, what impact do these deals have on target shareholders returns? Conditional on a merger occurring, a lower purchase premium obviously reduces their wealth. Alternatively, if target CEO contracting is necessary for a takeover to occur then the contract might boost target shareholder wealth.
Finally, if the contracting increases the post-merger value of the combined firms, the contracts should have a nonnegative impact on their wealth.
The focus of this study is on the impact of the target CEO's post-merger position on the purchase premium and target shareholder abnormal returns around the announcement of the deal in a sample of bank mergers during the period 1990-2004. Was the above exchange between Dimon and Harrison merely a humorous way to start a serious conversation? Or does it convey an important insight as to the way that target and acquiring CEOs view the importance of the target CEO's post-merger position? In addition to examining the impact of contracting between the target CEO and the acquirer, this paper also examines the announcement period returns of the acquirer and the combined firms to look for evidence that the contracting boosts overall value of the merger or results in wealth transfers to the acquirer's shareholders or both.
The two studies most directly relevant for our study are Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) and Wulf (2004) . Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) ask the question, "what is the benefit to the target CEO from consenting to the takeover?" 3 Their study analyzes 311 transactions completed in the U.S. between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 1997. They find that the target CEOs in their sample obtain a mean increase in wealth of $8 million to $11 million. While a large fraction of the target CEOs do not remain with the combined entity, the 3 target CEOs that become executives of the acquirer obtain smaller benefits. Those remaining also experience unusually high turnover rates for several years. The results from Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) provide marginally significant evidence that, in general, the gains to target shareholders are reduced when the target CEO obtains additional benefits from the merger (beyond those specified in his pre-merger employment contract with the target) but stronger evidence that target shareholders lose when the target CEO has below median ownership interest in the target. Wulf (2004) focuses on the issue of whether target CEOs accept lower returns for target shareholders in order to obtain power in the post-merger firm. In particular, she focuses on the abnormal returns associated with "mergers of equals" (MOEs) in which the two firms have approximately equal representation on the post-merger board over the period from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999. On average, the total gains as measured by abnormal returns are insignificantly different for her MOE and control samples. However, the target shareholders obtain a smaller proportion of these gains when governance is shared with the target and when the target CEO obtains greater post-merger control rights (that is, when the target board of directors has an equal or controlling interest on the post-merger board of directors of the combined firms and the merger agreement stipulates that the target CEO will assume the CEO or Chairman position in the combined firms within some specified period after the merger completion date).
A possible limitation of these two studies that limits their ability to obtain stronger results is their use of data across a variety of industries. The relationship between target returns and the post-merger role of the CEO may be obscured by a variety of factors including: differences in average purchase premiums across industries, differences in the roles that target CEOs might 4 reasonably expect to take with acquirers across industries (including cases where the target and acquirer come from different industries) and cross-industry differences in governance structures. This paper addresses the problems of the prior studies by focusing on a single industry, insured depositories (hereafter, banks). The banking industry has several special features that make it of special interest in evaluating the impact of target CEO contracting. First, it is one of the few industries with sufficient intra-industry mergers to provide a reasonable sample size.
The relaxation of legal restrictions on bank mergers during the 1980s and 1990s, especially restrictions on mergers across state borders, produced a wave of takeovers within the industry. 4 Second, it is likely to be easier to detect in banking if target CEOs accept lower purchase premiums in return for a role in the post-merger firm. Target CEOs' ability to threaten to obstruct a takeover is limited by the potential acquirer's ability to go directly to the target shareholders in a hostile takeover. However, hostile takeovers are rarely undertaken and almost never successful in banking, in part because bank mergers are required to obtain prior approval from bank regulators. Bank regulators are not necessarily opposed to hostile takeovers per se, but the regulatory approval process may take months, especially when the merger involves larger banks, which gives the target additional time to develop its defenses. Third, if participation by the target CEO can boost the value of the combined firms this may also be easier to detect in bank mergers. Banking is widely thought to be a "relationship" business. If the target CEO can help in maintaining these relationships then his continued presence after the merger should be recognized by investors as boosting the overall value of the combined firms.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we discuss our empirical model. In Section 2 we describe our data. In Section 3 we present our main results.
The paper concludes with summary remarks in Section 4.
Empirical model
A takeover can result in gains to the shareholders of the two firms to the extent the value of the target to the acquirer exceeds its value as an independent firm. The target's incentive to require a larger share of these gains depends in part on the CEO's power in the corporate governance structure and in part on the target CEO's incentives to agree to the acquisition. The CEO incentive to approve the deal arises both from factors outside and factors within the control of the acquirer. This section discusses the empirical proxies for the value of target to the acquirer, target governance structure, and target CEO incentives used in the analysis.
Shareholder returns
We proxy the return to the target shareholders using three different measures: (1) the purchase premium at announcement over the target's stock price 40 trading days before the announcement, (2) the premium over the target's stock price 20 trading days before the announcement, and (3) the cumulative abnormal returns during the window from two days before the announcement date to two days after the announcement date. We also measure the returns to the acquirer and to the combination of the two firms with the cumulative abnormal returns during the window from two days before the announcement date to two days after the announcement date.
Our measure of the abnormal returns associated with the merger announcement follows the event study based methodology used by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988 
where R i,t = return to firm i on day t; i α , i βˆ= market model parameter estimates, and R m,t = return to the value-weighted NYSE market portfolio on day t. The market model parameter estimates for each firm are obtained using a maximum of 240 trading days of daily returns data beginning 300 days before the first event. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR i,t ) from event day T1 to event day T2 is computed as:
AR CAR
The z-statistic is used to determine whether the abnormal returns are statistically significant.
Daily and cumulative abnormal returns of the combined firms are computed using the procedure in Houston and Ryngaert (1994) .
Value of the Target to Acquirer
The premium paid by the acquirer for a target depends on the difference between the value the acquirer places on control of the target versus the value the market places on owning a non-controlling interest in the firm. The literature analyzing bank mergers uses a variety of variables to control for the difference in the value. Most of the control variables used in the analysis are drawn from previous studies of bank mergers such as Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995); Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert (1999); and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) .
The starting point for measuring the value of the target both as a stand-alone firm and in an acquisition are its current profitability and variability of profitability. These are then augmented with measures of the level and variability of the profitability of the acquirer as proxies for potential changes in the level and variability of target's profitability. Further, the covariability of the acquirer's and target's earnings is included to proxy for the extent to which the acquisition would increase or reduce the variability of the acquirer's earnings. Five variables representing the level, variance and covariance of the acquirers' and targets' return on assets are included as proxies as in Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) . The targets' and acquirers' return on assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement date are represented by ROA t and ROA a , respectively. The variances of return on assets for the target and acquirer over the 13 quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date are represented by VROA t and VROA a , respectively. The covariance of the returns on their assets is represented by COV t,a .
Another important determinant of the value of the target is its likely growth rate after the merger. A proxy for the expected growth in the target's market is GTA t and a proxy for the influence of the acquirer on the growth rate is GTA a . Both measures are calculated as the growth in the respective firm's total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement.
The post-merger value of the combined firms also depends on the difficulty of merging the firms and the potential for cost savings. 
Target Governance
Whether higher shareholder control increases or decreases takeover premiums depends on the strength of the firm's takeover defenses and whether target CEOs negotiate for private benefits with the acquirer according to Moeller (2005) . 5 If a firm's takeover defenses are weak, as he argues was true in the 1980s, then lower shareholder control increases premium. The reason is that shareholders could overcome management opposition to the takeover if they exerted sufficient effort but they must be incented to make such costly efforts by a high takeover premium. The size of the premium required depended on the cost of overcoming management.
Greater shareholder control implied a lower cost of overcoming management, and hence a lower premium. On the other hand, Moeller (2005) argues that if a firm has strong takeover controls that allow the manager to block the transaction then acquirers must induce the CEO to approve the deal by offering private benefits to the CEO. In this case, a strong board limits these private benefits, with the result that the acquirer must pay more to complete the deal.
Given that the requirement for prior supervisory approval of bank mergers acts as a merger defense and that most of the CEOs in our sample receive some benefit (as discussed in section 3.1 below), Moeller's analysis would suggest that lower shareholder control should be associated with higher premiums for our sample. On the other hand, the CEO may benefit from a takeover to the extent that he was given a change of control (or golden parachute) by the target prior to the takeover. The indicator variable for a change of control provision, or golden parachutes, is HGolden. 
CEO incentives from the acquirer
The acquirer may incent the target's CEO to support the merger in two ways: offer a higher price which increases the value of the CEO's ownership and contract with the CEO for a position in the combined firms after the merger. To account for the managerial ownership effect, we include the percent of the target's shares owned by the CEO in our empirical specification as
CEO Shares.
The target CEO may obtain a variety of positions with the acquiring firm, albeit we did not find any examples where the target CEO became a chauffer. After the merger, the target CEO may obtain: (1) an operating position, (2) a position on the combined firm's board of directors, (3) a consulting position, and (4) no position at the combined firm. We further subdivide the operating positions into three categories: (1) the CEO of the combined firms, (2) the president or chief operating officer of the combined firms, or (3) 
Data
Our initial sample consists of the pair of target and acquirers identified from SNL's database covering the period 1990-2004. We match this sample of firms against a banking organization mergers and acquisitions sample obtained from Securities Data Corporation (SDC)
database. The SDC data includes offer prices for targets, announcement dates, and other 11 characteristics of the deal. In several cases the announcement date reported in the SNL database was different from that reported in the SDC database. Because the SDC database is most commonly used, we base the announcement dates in our article on those reported in the SDC database. 9 Following Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) we then reduced the sample to only those transactions where the market value of the target is at least 10 percent of the market value of the acquirer. 10 We also limit our sample to those targets whose total assets, as reported by SNL, prior to the merger announcement date exceed $1 billion. While the former criteria eliminates transactions that would unlikely have a material effect on the acquirer, the latter criteria excludes transactions involving targets who book of business would unlikely be substantial relative to other targets, avoiding extreme size disparities among targets that could generate results that have little, if anything, to do with the focus of our study. 11 We require that both the target and acquirer be publicly traded and listed on the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database. We also eliminated transactions in which the target or acquirer was a foreign banking organization. We are interested in the acquiring, the target, and a portfolio of both firms after the deal is completed. For each of our merger transactions, we use Proxy Statements, Form 10-K or a similar document to obtain share ownership, compensation, CEO age, board composition, and golden parachute (GP) information of the targets before the acquisition announcement date. We use Security Exchange Commission Form S-4 to obtain post-merger employment contracts (the appendix provides a summary of the key elements in the post-merger employment contracts between the target CEO and the acquiring firm for three of the transactions in our sample). Imposing our selection criteria on the SNL-matched-SDC samples resulted in a sample of 162 completed transactions covering the period 1990-2004.
Daily share prices for both target and acquirers are obtained from the CRSP file. The stock market index employed in our event study is the value-weighted portfolio (NYSE and AMEX) obtained from the CRSP database. Accounting data is obtained from the FR-Y9C
reports of income and condition filed by bank holding companies with the Federal Reserve and the Thrift Financial Report reports filed by thrifts with the Office of Thrift Supervision. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of 162 mergers. The median market capitalization of the acquirer is $2.0 billion and that of the target is $0.5 billion. The median ratio of target assets to the acquirer's assets is 0.355. Acquirers reported higher return on asset (ROA) and asset growth rates than the targets. 12 Target shareholders received a mean purchase premium of over 30 percent above the target's stock price measured over both 20 and 40 trading days prior to the announcement of the deal.
Empirical Results

Descriptive Statistics
The CEO characteristics given in Table 2 show that median share ownership by the target CEO prior to the merger is 1.03 percent. The median CEO is about 56 years old. Almost 70 percent of the target CEOs are also the chairman of their boards of directors but over 70 percent of their boards consist of independent directors. Slightly less than one-half of the firms in the sample had no independent blockholder. Table 3 documents the ways in which the typical CEO in our sample gained from the takeover. Over 95 percent of the CEOs had a change of control agreement with the target firm and we could confirm that the CEO received this change of control in over one-half of the cases.
The golden parachute frequency in our paper is substantially higher than that found in other 13 studies (Cotter and Zenner, 1994; Subramaniam and Daley, 2000; and Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith, 2000) .
Panel B of Table 3 The abnormal returns around the merger announcement date are provided in Table 4 .
The announcement period abnormal returns to target shareholders are a highly significant 13.44 percent over the event window [-2, +2] . Acquirer returns are a significantly negative 3.39 percent. However, a value weighted combination of the two firms produced positive and significant abnormal returns of 0.50 percent.
CEO Contracting and Target Shareholder Returns
The impact of CEO contracting on target shareholder returns is analyzed in Table 5 .
Most of the coefficients on the control variables are statistically insignificant. The only coefficients on the return variables that are significant are the coefficients on the covariance of the two firm's return on assets, COV t,a in the purchase premium equations and the coefficient on the variance of the acquirers' return on assets, VROA a , in the target abnormal return equation.
The two coefficients on the covariance term are significantly negative at the 10 percent level or better, while that on the variance term is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The covariance results are consistent with acquirers paying more for mergers that diversify the combined firm's risk. The coefficient on the variance term in the target abnormal return equation suggests that there is a greater stock market reaction to those mergers in which the acquirer is, on average, relatively more risky. The above two results are consistent with risky acquirers being willing to pay more because they anticipate being able to integrate the target's franchise into their operations to diversify the combined firms book of assets.
All three of the coefficients on the CEO having a golden parachute, HGolden, are negative and two are significantly negative at the 1 percent level. All three of the coefficients on the binary variable indicating the absence of an independent blockholder, Blockholder, are positive and highly significantly (better than 5 percent). These findings are inconsistent with Moeller's (2005) results. 13 Instead, these results are consistent with target CEOs demanding excessively high purchase premiums in the absence of outside blockholders that are able to force acceptance of the takeover despite CEO opposition or the CEO receiving a golden parachute that at least partially compensates him for the loss of his position.
The coefficients on the position obtained by the CEO in the post-merger firm is negative for 18 of the 21 coefficients (3 measures of returns times 7 different positions), including 8 of 9
coefficients on the operating position variables, CEO, President, Other Officer. The three coefficients on CEO, the target CEO becoming the CEO of the combined firms, and the three coefficients on Other officer, the target CEO becoming a non-top executive officer of the combined firms, are individually significant (at the 10 percent level or better). So is the coefficient on Director for the equation estimating purchase price premium measured over 20 trading days. An F-test for the three operating positions rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients on the three operating positions variables are equal to zero at the 10 percent level or better in the two purchase price premium equations. The F-test for the three board positions (Chairman, Vice-Chair, and Director) are all insignificant at conventional levels.
Thus, our analysis of the returns to target shareholders suggests that, conditional on a takeover offer being made, that target shareholders receive a smaller premium when their CEO obtains an operating position with the acquiring firm. Not only is this reduction in target shareholder return statistically significant in most cases, the differences are also economically large. 
Impact of Contracting On the Distribution and Amount of Gains
The acquirer may contract with the target CEO to transfer wealth or to boost the overall value of the transaction or both. The evidence from target returns is that the contracting serves to reduce the purchase premium obtained by target shareholders in completed takeovers. This subsection analyzes acquirer returns to determine whether the contracting increases the overall value of the deal and whether it results in significant gains to acquirer shareholders.
The analysis of the abnormal returns associated with the acquirer and combined firm are presented in Table 6 , as is a copy of the analysis of the abnormal returns for the target from Table 5 for comparison purposes. None of the coefficients on the return variables are significant in either the acquirer or combined abnormal returns. The acquirer's abnormal returns and the combined abnormal returns are significantly negatively related to the acquirer's growth rate, GTA a , while the premiums paid to targets are unaffected by how fast the acquirer is growing.
The significantly negative coefficient in the acquirers' abnormal return equation is consistent Overall, the results from the estimation of the post-merger position variables in the various premium and abnormal return equations is most consistent with the hypothesis that the primary benefit of the target CEO receiving a post-merger position is that it offsets the incentives he would otherwise have to oppose a takeover bid.
Robustness tests
In addition to our primary results, we performed a variety of robustness tests. We (1) added a binary variable equal to one if the target CEO was also the chairman of the target's board, (2) added two binary variables to distinguish whether the target or the acquirer were commercial banks (or bank holding companies) versus thrifts (or thrift holding companies, (3) substituted the dollar amount of the target CEO's share ownership for his percentage ownership, and (4) included a binary variable equal to one if SNL coded the deal as a stock transaction.
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Finally we used the SNL announcement dates rather than the SDC announcement dates. The difference in the two is that SNL dates correspond to the actual announcement whereas some of the SDC dates reflect earlier strong rumors of a deal.
Although the details vary based on the exact specification, the overall results are generally similar to those presented in Tables 5 and 6 . Significantly, the most important results are essentially unchanged, albeit some coefficients that are borderline significant in Tables 5 and   6 become borderline insignificant in some alternative specifications. The only consistently significant variable on the target CEO's post-merger role is for the target CEO becoming CEO of the post-merger firm, CEO. The variable CEO is significantly negative for all three measures of target shareholder returns, but insignificant for the acquirer's announcement abnormal returns, and the combined returns of the target and the acquirer. Further, the coefficients on the variables for the target CEO also being chair of the target's board, the binary variables for commercial bank versus thrift status, the variable for the dollar value of shares and for a stock takeover are consistently insignificant.
When we use SNL announcement dates rather than the SDC announcement dates, the results are slightly weaker, although the direction of impact is similar. In particular, the variable CEO is negative in all three of the target shareholders' return equations, but only significant in the two premium equations. All three of the coefficients on the binary variable indicating the absence of an independent blockholder, Blockholder, are positive and statistically significant (two of the coefficients at better than 1 percent and the third at the 10 percent level). As before, none of the coefficients on the post-merger position variables are significant in either the acquirer's abnormal returns or the combined firms' abnormal returns equations.
Conclusion
Mr. Dimon's and Mr. Harrison's joking about the tradeoff between the target CEO's post-merger position and the returns to the target shareholders in completed mergers appears to have some basis in reality. We find evidence that target shareholders receive a lower rate of return when their CEO takes a position with the acquirer, especially if that position is that of CEO of the combined firms. The lower returns received by target shareholders could be due to their CEO agreeing to sell the firm at a lowball price that transfers wealth to the acquirer's shareholders. Alternatively, the positions may merely compensating target CEOs for any loss of firm specific human capital and control rents they would have received had the target remained independent. In terms of the Mr. Dimon and Mr. Harrison story, is the 40 percent asked by Mr.
Dimon too high a price for JPMorgan Chase to offer? Or is the 15 percent offered by Mr.
Harrison a lowball offer that would take wealth from the target's shareholders? Our evidence from a sample of bank mergers suggests the problem is that the 40 percent asked by Mr. Dimon is too high.
The most direct evidence on the question of too high an ask price or too low of a bid comes from the insignificant impact of these positions on acquirer's announcement returns. If the target CEO obtaining a post-merger position were permitting acquirers to make lowball bids then we should observe significantly positive announcement returns for the acquirer. However, these returns are insignificant.
Two additional pieces of evidence are consistent with target CEOs sometimes demanding excessive takeover premiums to compensate them for the loss of their human capital and control rents. First, the target CEO's support for a takeover may be less important if the target has a blockholder, who has both the incentive to monitor the firm and, likely, an important say in the firm's governance. We find that banks that have a significant blockholder also have lower takeover premiums and lower event returns. Second, another way to at least partially compensate the CEO for the loss of his position is to give him a golden parachute. We find that 20 target shareholder abnormal returns are significantly lower if the target CEO has a golden parachute.
Finally, it is possible that target CEOs were offered positions because they add value to the overall deal. However, we find no evidence in support of this hypothesis. The only significant coefficient on a CEO's post-merger position is a negative coefficient on the CEO becoming chairman of the combined organization. 
APPENDIX -Description of three post-merger employment agreements
Campbell will serve as Vice Chairman of M&T and as Chairman of M&T's Pennsylvania operations.
During the employment period, Mr. Campbell will serve as a member of M&T's board of directors.
Following the termination of this three-year period and until his 65th birthday, Mr. Campbell will continue employment on a part-time basis on terms to be agreed to between him and M&T.
Under Mr. Campbell's employment agreement, for each year during the initial three-year employment period, he will receive (1) an annual base salary no less than $460,000, and (2) an annual cash bonus of no less than $168,505. During the part-time employment period, he will receive an annual base salary of $400,000. If Mr. Campbell dies before his 65th birthday, 50% of the annual base salary he would have otherwise received during the remainder of the part-time employment period will be paid to his current spouse, if she survives him.
Upon completion of the merger, M&T will grant Mr. Campbell an option to acquire 50,000
shares of M&T's common stock (on a post-split basis) which will vest in three equal installments on each of the first, second and third anniversaries of the completion of the merger (or, if earlier, upon the occurrence of a change of control of M&T) and will have a term of ten years from the date of grant 22 without regard to Mr. Campbell's earlier termination of employment. Mr. Campbell will also receive upon completion of the merger a lump sum payment of $1,250,000 (provided he is employed on such date).
Mr. Campbell's employment agreement provides for a lifetime annual retirement benefit of $350,000, less any amounts payable under qualified and non-qualified defined benefit retirement plans, commencing upon his 65 th birthday. Upon the death of Mr. Campbell, his current spouse, if she survives him, will receive an annual benefit for the rest of her life in an amount equal to 50% of this retirement benefit. During the initial three-year employment period, Mr. Campbell will be entitled to participate in all employee benefit, welfare and other plans, practices, policies and programs that apply generally to senior executives of M&T on a basis no less favorable than that provided to those executives, except that if Mr. Campbell's employment is terminated for any reason other than for cause by M&T, M&T will continue to provide him and his current spouse with medical and dental benefits for the remainder of their lives on a basis no less favorable than that on which those benefits were provided immediately before the termination. The employment agreement contains confidentiality, non-competition and non-solicitation provisions that apply while Mr. Campbell is employed and for specified periods thereafter.
In the event that Mr. Campbell's employment is terminated prior to the end of the initial threeyear employment period by M&T other than for "cause" or "disability" or by Mr. Campbell for "good reason" (each as defined in Mr. Campbell's employment agreement), Mr. Campbell will be entitled to receive the following payments and benefits:
-Annual base salary through the date of termination and a pro-rata annual bonus through the date of termination (based on the minimum annual bonus under the employment agreement); -A lump sum payment equal to the product of (1) The Company shall promptly pay, or cause the Bank to pay, to the Executive an amount equal to the product of 2.00 times the Executive's "base amount" as defined in Section 280G(b)(3) of the Code (such "base amount" to be derived from Executive's compensation paid by the Company and the Bank).
Endnotes
outliers we re-estimated the model dropping all acquisitions where the target or acquirer grew by more than 100% during the 13 month period prior to the takeover. We obtained similar qualitative results. 13 The definitions of both shareholder control variables, Indepdirectors and Blockholder, varies from those used by Moeller (2005) but our basic results hold with his definitions. Moeller uses a binary variable equal to 1 if inside directors constitute 40 percent or more of the target's shareholders. Our coefficient on inside directors has the same sign but is statistically insignificant when premium is estimated over a 40 day period and for the abnormal return. Additionally, the coefficient on inside directors has the opposite sign when premium is measured over 20 days.
Moeller uses a 10 percent cutoff rather than a 5 percent cutoff for blockholder control. We obtain the same sign but reduced significance levels when our model is estimated with a 10 percent cutoff for the Blockholder binary variable. We further tried to replicate Moeller's results using our base model with his blockholder variable and without our variables for the CEO's role (CEO, President, ...) . The coefficient on the blockholder variable remains the same (the opposite of his sign) and it is statistically significant.
Although we could not identify the source of the difference in our results, there are several potentially important differences in our samples. One is that Moeller (2005) uses a cross-industry sample of non-financial firms during the 1990s whereas we use a sample of banking firms drawn from the period 1990-2004. Another possible explanation for the differences in results is that Moeller (2005) requires the market value of the target to at least equal 5 percent of the acquirer's whereas we use a 10 percent cutoff. In our preliminary data gathering efforts we found that the frequency of target CEOs receiving a post-merger position declined dramatically when the acquirer was less than 10 percent of the target, perhaps because the responsibility CEO of such a relatively small target would be more comparable to the acquirer's regional managers than to the acquirer's senior management or someone sitting on the acquirer's board. Asset size is measured by the book value of assets for the quarter before the merger announcement. The market value of equity is measured twenty days before the merger announcement and equals the number of shares outstanding times the price per share of common stock. ROA a and ROA t are average quarterly return on assets for the acquirer and target, respectively. Average quarterly return on assets is computed as the mean of the ratio of net income divided by total assets for the thirteen quarters preceding the merger announcement quarter. GTA a is the growth rate of the acquirer's total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement. GTA t is the growth rate of the target's total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement. The asset growth rate is the arithmetic mean. PREM20 is the premium of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target's share price 20 days before the announcement. PREM40 is the premium of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target's share price 40 days before the announcement. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) for a discussion of this methodology. Following Houston and Ryngaert (1994) , we define portfolio abnormal return for each merger (i =1 to 162) as:
where MV T,-20 is the market value of the target firm twenty days before the merger bid for the target, MV A,-20 is the market value of the acquirer firm twenty days before the merger bid for the target. The variance of each merger i's portfolio abnormal return is given below: The valuation change is computed by taking the abnormal return to the target multiplied by the target's market value twenty days before the merger announcement date and adding to it the abnormal return to the acquirer multiplied by the acquirer's market value twenty days before the merger announcement date. The three proxies for target shareholder returns are PREM20 = the premium of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target's share price 20 days before the announcement, PREM40 = the premium of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target's share price 40 days before the announcement, and T_Car = the target's five-day cumulative abnormal returns over the [-2, +2] window. The independent variables are: ROA t = mean return on assets of target over the 13 quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; ROA a = mean return on assets of acquirer over the 13 quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; VROA t = the variance of the return on assets of the target using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; VROA a = the variance of the return on assets of the acquirer using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; COV t,a = the covariance of the target's and acquirer's return on assets using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; GTA a = the growth rate of the acquirer's total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement; GTA t = the growth rate of the target's total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement; Rel_asset = the target banking organization's total assets divided by the sum of the target banking organization's and the acquirer banking organization's total assets; Instate = a binary variable that equals 1 if the target and acquirer are located in the same state, and 0 otherwise; Blockholder = binary variable for independent block ownership. It is equal to one if independent blocker ownership share is less than 5%, and zero otherwise; Table 6 . Estimation of Acquirer, Combined and target announcement returns
Mean
The three proxies for target shareholder returns are PREM20 = the premium of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target's share price 20 days before the announcement, PREM40 = the premium of purchase price at the time of the announcement over the target's share price 40 days before the announcement, and T_Car = the target's five-day cumulative abnormal returns over the [-2, +2] window. The independent variables are: ROA t = mean return on assets of target over the 13 quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; ROA a = mean return on assets of acquirer over the 13 quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; VROA t = the variance of the return on assets of the target using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; VROA a = the variance of the return on assets of the acquirer using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; COV t,a = the covariance of the target's and acquirer's return on assets using 13 quarters of data ending with the quarter prior to the merger announcement; GTA a = the growth rate of the acquirer's total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement; GTA t = the growth rate of the target's total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement; Rel_asset = the target banking organization's total assets divided by the sum of the target banking organization's and the acquirer banking organization's total assets; Instate = a binary variable that equals 1 if the target and acquirer are located in the same state, and 0 otherwise; Blockholder = binary variable for independent block ownership. It is equal to one if independent blocker ownership share is less than 5%, and zero otherwise; Indepdirectors = percent of board of directors that are not inside or grey directors; Years-To-Retire =65 minus the CEO's age if the CEO is less than 65 or zero if the CEO is 65 or older; and HGolden = pre-merger change of control with target binary indicator variable that equals 1 if the target CEO has a change of control contract with the target firm, zero otherwise;CEO Share = target CEO's percentage ownership of outstanding common shares; CEO = 1 if the CEO becomes CEO of the new firm ; President = 1 if the CEO becomes president of the new firm; Other officer = 1 if the CEO assumes some other officer position in the new firm (typically CEO of a subsidiary); Chairman = 1 if the CEO becomes chairman of the new firm; ViceChair= 1 if the CEO becomes Vice-chairman of the new firm; Director = 1 if the CEO becomes a director of the new firm; Consult = 1 if the CEO becomes a consultant to the new firm. The omitted variable for benefits from the new firm is None = binary variable that is equal to one if the target CEO does not obtain any position with the combined firm. Note, only the CEO's highest position in the new company is recognized; for example a CEO that is also a president of the firm is coded as CEO=1, President=0. Numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics. Annual fixed effects are also included in the estimation but are not reported. The F-test for operating position tests the hypothesis that coefficients on CEO, President and Other Officer are zero. The F-test for board role only tests the hypothesis that coefficients on Chairman, Vice-Chair, and Director are zero. The t-statistics and Fstatistics are starred if the regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10 (*), 5(**), and 1 (***) percent level. 
